Newspapers immediately began reporting that no warnings were issued for the tornadoes of October 3, 1992. The NWS forecaster on duty at the Ruskin office, Chuck Eggleton, was interviewed for the Tampa Bay Times on October 4. He said he didnβt issue a warning because nothing was on the radar screen to indicate storms were present. βEven severe thunderstorms werenβt detected, and severe thunderstorms are something we would normally warn for.β Paul Hebert, meteorologist in charge at the NWS Miami, was also interviewed. He indicated that the Miami staff determined βa full day earlier that the big mass of stormy weather bearing down on Florida from the Gulf of Mexico was likely to generate tornadoes.β Did the Ruskin office see that potential as well? It was also reported that the Ruskin radar βcanβt detect the presence of tornadoes.β They were not scheduled to get the newest generation radar until 1995. The Tampa Bay Times documented that the NOAA weather radio broadcast βwent to low-power transmissionβ late that Saturday morning. It then went silent βafter an air-conditioning unit failed and the transmitter overheated.β By the time it came back up, the tornado threat had ended.
It was already determined at this point that a disaster survey team would be formed to analyze what happened and make recommendations for improvement in warning and forecast services. The group issued its final report in July of 1993. In the executive summary portion of the document, it was stated that NWS meteorologists at the National Severe Storms Forecast Center (NSSFC), the Weather Service Forecast Office in Miami, and the Weather Service Office in Tampa Bay βdid not expect tornadoes on the morning of October 3, 1992.β NWS offices launch weather balloons twice a day to sample atmospheric conditions. The first launch that morning was unsuccessful due to balloon icing. A second launch occurred at 8:30 AM ET, and it indicated conditions were ripe for severe weather. The data received, though, was delayed due to the failure of the first launch.
The executive summary revealed that as the balloon information reached the Severe Local Storms forecaster in Kansas City, βthe mid-morning Severe Weather Outlook was revised to include a slight risk of severe thunderstorms for the Tampa Bay area. Although this updated Severe Weather Outlook was disseminated 40 minutes before the next routine issuance was due, it was too late to heighten the awareness of forecasters in the field to the impending disaster; just minutes later the first tornado struck Largo, FL. With perfect hindsight, because of the impressive nature of the new data, the Severe Local Storms forecaster in Kansas City probably should have gone ahead and issued a tornado watch first, and then update the Severe Weather Outlook afterwards.β
A resident in the Largo area phoned the Tampa Bay office and alerted them that βa tornado had touched down in Largo.β The report was confirmed with the Pinellas County Emergency Management office. Since the event was over, the NWS issued a Severe Weather Statement versus a warning.
Next, the executive summary addressed the issues with the radar. The forecasters in Tampa were using a WSR-57 radar. βTheir radar did not show typical tornadic signatures or other characteristics associated with severe storms. Post-analysis of the data from the new Doppler radar (WSR-88D) in Melbourne revealed that even at the fringe of its range it sensed these distant storms. However, the severe weather signatures on the WSR-88D were momentary. The lone forecaster on duty, occupied with severe storms over Melbourneβs marine forecast area, could not have been expected to identify these brief clues on the edge of the radar display.β It was determined that if the Tampa office had had a WSR-88D, the forecasters would have seen the approaching storms and βmore timely warnings would likely have resulted.β
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